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ABSTRACT
We present attacks that use only the volume of responses to range
queries to reconstruct databases. Our focus is on practical attacks
that work for large-scale databases with many values and records,
without requiring assumptions on the data or query distributions.
Our work improves on the previous state-of-the-art due to Kellaris
et al. (CCS 2016) in all of these dimensions.
Our main attack targets reconstruction of database counts and
involves a novel graph-theoretic approach. It generally succeeds
when R, the number of records, exceeds N 2/2, where N is the
number of possible values in the database. For a uniform query
distribution, we show that it requires volume leakage from only
O(N 2 logN ) queries (cf. O(N 4 logN ) in prior work).
We present two ancillary attacks. The first identifies the value of
a new item added to a database using the volume leakage from fresh
queries, in the setting where the adversary knows or has previously
recovered the database counts. The second shows how to efficiently
recover the ranges involved in queries in an online fashion, given
an auxiliary distribution describing the database.
Our attacks are all backed with mathematical analyses and ex-
tensive simulations using real data.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Cryptanalysis and other attacks;
Management and querying of encrypted data;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Setting. In a recent ground-breaking paper, Kellaris et al. [14]
initiated the systematic study of volume attacks against databases.
Here, the setting is an adversary who is able to learn how many
records are returned in response to queries made to a database.
From just this information, the adversary tries to reconstruct the
database counts, that is the exact number of records in the database
having each particular value. As a secondary target, the adversary
may try to learn the content of individual queries.
We stress that, in the envisaged setting, the adversary does not
know the individual queries (these may be encrypted) and does not
learn which records are returned in response to each query (so it
does not have what is known as access pattern leakage). In some
settings, the attacker may know something about the distribution
on queries (for example, that they are uniformly distributed range
queries), and it may also have access to some kind of reference
distribution which represents (possibly inaccurate) side information
about the distribution from which the database is drawn. However,
we are also interested in attacks in the “bare” setting where the
attacker has no ancillary information.
Such volume attacks may be quite easy to mount in practice. For
example, the attacker might be located on the network between
a client making queries and a server hosting the database, with
all interactions between client and server being encrypted. Yet
the communication pattern and volume of data on the wire from
server to client may indicate how many records are returned from
each query, since typical secure communications protocols like TLS
do not attempt to hide the directionality or amount of data being
transmitted (indeed, modern TLS cipher suites like those based
on AES-GCM directly leak plaintext lengths in ciphertexts). This
makes volume attacks possible. This setting is of course related
to problems in the field of traffic analysis, such as mounting and
preventing website fingerprinting attacks [7, 22]. Relatedly, the
time taken to process database queries may act as a side channel to
reveal the volume of responses.
As a second example of the relevance of volume attacks, the
database server itself might be adversarial, with the client using
advanced encryption techniques (possibly in combination with
trusted hardware like SGX) to hide queries and access patterns
from the server. Existing techniques for this purpose [4, 5] do hide
the queries but tend to leak the access pattern, rendering them
vulnerable to quite devastating attacks, see [14, 16]. The next nat-
ural evolutionary step in this area, then, will be to combine the
existing techniques with oblivious memory access techniques such
as ORAM [9, 23] to hide the access patterns. However, not only
would this degrade performance, but also such an approach might
be of dubious security value, since volume attacks mounted by the
server would still be possible and might have significant security
impact. Moreover, as recent work has shown [10], SQL databases
store the cardinalities of responses to past queries, so volumes may
leak even to the so-called snapshot adversary who is only able to
compromise the server for a short period of time and grab a copy of
its memory. This is a weaker adversarial setting than the persistent
attacker setting implicit to assuming an adversarial server.
The impact of volume attacks, if possible, can be serious. Al-
though they cannot reconstruct the exact connection between indi-
vidual records and their values, they do enable the exact database
counts to be reconstructed, and this may represent significant leak-
age. As illustrative examples, consider a company’s salary database
leaking to a competitor, or a hospital’s mortality data becoming
exposed. This is even so when the adversary already has an approxi-
mation to the database distribution, since knowing exact counts can
represent a much more serious privacy violation than merely hav-
ing approximations to those counts. For example, by mounting the
attack and recovering exact counts at different points in time, the
adversary may be able to deduce the value of specific records of in-
terest that were added or removed from the database. Furthermore,
the exact database counts can leak important information about
the values of specific outliers, which can then be de-anonymising.
Indeed, the privacy risks of releasing precise database counts were
among the core motivations of modern differential privacy research.
Range queries. In this work, we focus on database reconstruc-
tion using the volume leakage of range queries. Range queries are
perhaps the simplest type of query beyond point queries, and con-
stitute a central primitive in modern databases: for example, four
queries in the TPC-H query benchmark (designed to reflect real
workloads) contain explicit range queries. In the setting of range
queries, data takes on numerical values in some range [1,N ] (the
value of the left endpoint is fixed at 1 only for ease of exposition,
and without loss of generality [16]). All range queries are of the
form [x ,y] for some 1 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ N . When a range query [x ,y] is
issued, all records with values z ∈ [x ,y] are returned in response
to the query. Because we target volume attacks, recall that the ad-
versary only sees the number of records returned by the query, and
not the record identifiers, or the values x ,y.
Existing work. Kellaris et al. [14] (KKNO) made an excellent first
step in understanding volume attacks arising from range queries,
formalising this style of attack and introducing a pair of algo-
rithms that are each capable of performing database reconstruction.
KKNO’s attacks were the first to demonstrate that reconstructing
database counts solely from the volume leakage of range queries is
possible. However their attacks are severely limited in practice, for
two reasons. First, KKNO’s algorithm strongly relies on the assump-
tion that range queries are drawn independently and uniformly at
random. Real-world queries are not expected to be uniform, or in-
dependent. If these conditions are not met, KKNO’s algorithm fails.
In fact the uniformity assumption seems inherent to the KKNO
algorithm, which exploits specific properties of that distribution;
it is unclear how the algorithm could be adapted to more general
distributions. A second limitation of KKNO’s attack in practice is
that it requires observing the volume leakage from O(N 4 logN )
queries. For N = 100 for instance, this number represents about
half a billion queries. For further discussion, see Appendix A.
It may seem at first that this query complexity is unavoidable.
Indeed as shown in [14], any generic algorithm succesfully achiev-
ing database reconstruction from volume leakage must require as
many as Ω(N 4) range queries. However, the example databases
demonstrating this are certainly pathological, and one might won-
der whether this is the true barrier to performance for typical
databases in which the values in records are drawn from some
reasonable distribution. Our work shows that it is not.
Our results. Because of the ease with which they can be mounted,
their real-world impact on privacy, and their likely future impor-
tance, it is vital to understand volume attacks better. This is what
we set out to do in this work. Our focus is on making database re-
construction (DR) attacks using volume leakage from range queries
more practical.
In this direction, our main result is a volume-based DR attack
for range queries that does not rely on any uniformity or indepen-
dence assumptions on the query distribution. Instead, it only needs
to observe each distinct volume at least once, regardless of how
queries are drawn. The former property makes our attack much
more practical than those of KKNO, which as discussed above cru-
cially rely on a uniformity assumption. The latter property leads to
a substantial reduction in the number of queries needed for a DR
attack, since now only the “coupon collector number” of queries
needs to be seen for the query distribution. For example, if for
the purpose of comparison to KKNO’s algorithm, we assume that
queries are uniform, then our algorithm only requires O(N 2 logN )
queries, instead of O(N 4 logN ) for KKNO’s.
Inmore detail, our approach reduces the problem of DR to finding
a clique in a certain graph that is constructed from the volume
leakage. By applying suitable preprocessing, in practice, we find
that we actually often end up in the situationwhere clique finding in
the graph is trivial, avoiding the need for expensive clique-finding
algorithms. We evaluate the performance of our algorithm using
real medical datasets obtained from the US government Healthcare
Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Nationwide Inpatient Sample
(NIS).
Our attack has two main limitations. First, as noted above, we
assume that every range query must be issued at least once. This
is certainly a strong assumption. Nevertheless, it is considerably
weaker than the assumption required by KKNO’s attack, which
needs that every query should be observed multiple times (roughly
N 2 times on average) so that the exact frequency of every volume
can be determined. Furthermore, we believe it is reasonable to
expect that a secure encrypted database should remain secure even
when every range query has been issued.
The second main limitation of our attack is that it does not suc-
ceed for all databases. Indeed that would be impossible, since it
would then have to require Ω(N 4) queries due to the lower bound
from [14], as discussed earlier. Instead we aim to cover typical
parameter regimes that include many real-world databases. As-
sumptions on the database required by our algorithm are twofold.
First, if we wish to recover the exact count of every value in the
database, then we must assume that the database is dense, in the
sense that every value must be taken by at least one record (equiva-
lently, there is no value with a zero count). However, our attack does
extend to the non-dense (or sparse) case, with the limitation that it
only recovers non-zero database counts. This point is discussed in
more detail in Section 3.3.
Second, our attack does not succeed for all parameter regimes,
although our experiments show a high success rate on real-world
datasets. In addition to experiments, to help provide insight about
parameter regimes where our attack succeeds, we build a statistical
model of how the number of records R and the number of values
N influence the adversary’s view of volumes, and how this affects
the success of our attack. For example, if for the purpose of the
model we assume a uniform distribution of values across records,
and a uniform distribution on ranges, then our model predicts that
the number of records R required for our attack to succeed should
be Ω(N 2) when the leakage from O(N 2 logN ) queries is available.
This estimate matches with what we observe in practice in our
experiments, despite several idealisations made in building the
model: we find that when R exceeds about N 2/2, our clique-finding
algorithm works extremely well in practice (given volume leakage
from enough queries), but its performance declines markedly when
R becomes significantly lower than N 2/2.
In addition to our main attack, we propose two ancillary attacks.
The first of these ancillary attacks considers a setting where the
adversary has already recovered exact database counts, for example
as a result of running our main attack. Then we assume the database
is updated with a new record. We propose an algorithm to deduce
the value of that new record, purely from observing the volume of
range queries, as in the previous attack. This enables the adversary
to update its knowledge of the database on the fly as new records
are added.
Like our main attack, the algorithm we propose does not require
an assumption on the query distribution. However if for the sake
of analysing the performance of the algorithm, we do make the
assumption that queries are uniformly distributed, then we are able
to show that only O(N ) queries are needed for our algorithm to
recover the value of the newly added recorded, provided again that
R is Ω(N 2). We stress that the uniformity assumption is needed
only for analysis; the algorithm still works well without it. We go
on to show that even better performance can be achieved if only
approximate recovery of the new value is desired. This analysis
again supports our experimental results using HCUP datasets. For
example, our experiments show that on a real-world hospital data-
base of about 20000 records, the median number of queries needed
to ascertain the age of a patient in a newly added record to within
10 years is only 17 queries; after 57 queries it is known within just
2 years.
Our second ancillary attack shows how to efficiently recover the
ranges involved in queries in an online fashion, given a reference
distribution for the database. This reference distribution could be
obtained by a successful DR attack, but it could also be an inaccurate
estimate obtained from a related dataset or a previous breach. The
attack relies on the following idea: given the volume leakage for a
query, we can compare that leakage to volumes obtained syntheti-
cally from all the ranges in the reference distribution. In our attack,
we just output the set of all ranges whose volumes are close (in
a well-defined sense) to the leaked volume. Although simple, this
idea turns out to be powerful. It is also amenable to analysis. For
example, assuming the database is drawn exactly from the reference
distribution, we are able to prove that the output set always con-
tains the correct range, except with some small (and tunable) error.
This follows from an application of the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz
inequality, a Chernoff-type bound on the maximum distance be-
tween the empirical and true CDFs of a distribution. Surprisingly,
our simple “CDF matching” algorithm continues to work well even
when the reference distribution is not particularly accurate. To
demonstrate this, we again use the HCUP datasets; we compile a
reference distribution by aggregating data from one year, and use
it in attacks against individual hospitals from other years. For more
than 80% of hospitals our attack is able to correctly eliminate all but
fifteen possibilities for some queries on the AGE attribute (which
has 4186 possible queries).
In its entirety, our work shows that volume attacks, perhaps
not yet considered a serious security threat because of unrealistic
assumptions or poor performance, should be considered a real
concern in practice, not only in advanced settings (like an honest-
but-curious database server) but even in basic settings such as a
network-based or snapshot adversary. Our work should also serve
as a warning for researchers developing new database encryption
schemes: simply hiding access patterns is not enough; volumes
must be hidden too.
2 BACKGROUND AND SETTING
The setting we consider has two parties: a client and a server. The
client stores no information locally and the server stores a database
that the client queries. In this paper we will treat the database as a
sequence of values between 1 and N (hereafter, “records”), but will
not assume anything about how records are stored or accessed. We
assume client-server communication is unbreakable and that the
queries and responses sent between the client and server reveal no
information except for the number of records in the response. This
is an extremely conservative setting: the attacker neither knows
nor can issue any queries.
Reconstruction attacks. Call the number of records with a given
value the count of the value. As discussed in the introduction, our
main attack targets database reconstruction (DR), which is to say it
attempts to recover the counts of all values. KKNO observed that
counts can only be recovered up to reflection, meaning that for any
value k , the recovered count could be for k or N + 1 − k . When no
assumptions can be made about the number of records or the counts
of individual elements (we will call this sparse), Kellaris et al. proved
that Ω(N 4) queries are required to perform DR generically. We will
also study two other attack types. The first, update recovery, learns
the value of a single record added after the database is reconstructed.
The second is query reconstruction, which tries to reconstruct the
queries rather than the database.
Notation and terminology. Recall that N is the number of pos-
sible values. We assume (without loss of generality) that set of pos-
sible values is [1,N ]. The number of records is denoted by R. We
let [x ,y] for 1 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ N represent a query for all records whose
value is in the closed interval from x to y. There are N (N + 1)/2
possible range queries. The volume of a range query [x ,y] is the
number of records whose value lies in [x ,y]. We also say that these
records match the range query. We call volumes the set of integers
that are the volume of some range. We denote the volume of a range
q = [x ,y] by vol(q). We say that a database is dense iff every value is
taken by at least one record. We will use standard asymptotic nota-
tion (O , Ω, etc.) as well as “tilde” asymptotic notation like O˜ , which
simply hides polylog factors. log() denotes the natural logarithm.
Assumptions. We assume that the total number of records, R,
is known by the adversary. We believe this is a reasonable and
conservative assumption. Releasing the aggregate size of a database
(even one containing sensitive information) has little or no privacy
implications in most settings, and the valueRmay in fact be publicly
available. Even if the information is not public, an adversary can
infer R using the on-disk size of a database or by observing network
traffic while a database is restored from backup.
We also assume the adversary knows the total number of possible
data values N in the field targeted by the range queries. Note that
this number does not depend on the database under attack, but only
on the type of data being targeted. Other assumptions required by
our main attack are discussed in Section 1.
Unless otherwise specified, we will never assume an attacker
knows either the query distribution or the database distribution. An
assumption on the query distribution becomes necessary when it
comes to analysing the query complexity of the attacks though: in-
deed the client could otherwise repeat the same query forever, and
the adversary would never learn anything new. To give meaningful
and clear analyses we will thus sometimes assume a uniform distri-
bution; however, in every case the algorithm itself does not require
that assumption to succeed. We make these assumptions to provide
analytical insight into a “typical” behavior of the algorithm. Further,
our attacks are evaluated on real-world non-uniform datasets.
3 PRACTICAL VOLUME-ONLY
RECONSTRUCTION ATTACKS
In this section, we describe and analyze our main result, namely
a practical database reconstruction attack using only the volume
leakage of range queries. Our attack uses only a set of range volumes
as input, and does not use any distribution-dependent frequency
information. In particular, the success of the attack is not dependent
on knowing the query distribution.
We begin this section by discussing the requirement of data den-
sity, presenting the key idea behind our algorithm – identifying
elementary ranges – and then providing an overview of the algo-
rithm’s steps. We explain it in detail in Section 3.1. We then analyze
it in Section 3.2 and present the results of practical experiments in
Section 3.3.
Data density. The main setting of our algorithm is the case where
the database is dense; that is, where every value in [1,N ] matches
at least one record. Our algorithm succeeds on dense databases,
and can also succeed if the database is not dense. In that case,
it is not possible to recover the counts of all values, because it
is impossible to learn which values are matched by zero records
from just a set of volumes of range queries. Therefore, we define
success as recovery of the non-zero counts of all values in the correct
order; that is, the only missing information is precisely the set of
values with zero matching records. This still reveals a considerable
amount of information to the adversary. Some knowledge of the
database distribution may enable reconstruction of all counts. This
is discussed further in Section 3.3. Nevertheless, the main focus of
our attack is dense databases, where recovering the counts of all
values is possible with just a set of range query volumes.
Elementary ranges. Consider the ranges [1, 1], [1, 2], . . ., [1,N ]
– let us call them elementary ranges. Knowing the volumes of these
N ranges is necessary and sufficient for reconstruction: if we know
the volumes of [1, 1], [1, 2], . . ., [1,N ], then the number of records
that have value k is the difference between the (k − 1)-st and k-th
element in the list (treating the 0-th element as zero). The goal of
our algorithm will therefore be to identify the volumes of these
elementary ranges among the set of all volumes.
Our approach stems from the following observation: every range
[x ,y] can be expressed either as [1,y] (if x = 1) or as [1,y]\[1,x−1]
(if x > 1). In other words, every range is either an elementary range,
or can be expressed as the set difference of two elementary ranges.
From the point of view of volumes, this means that every volume is
either the volume of an elementary range (an elementary volume), or
the difference of the volumes of two elementary ranges. Conversely,
the set difference of two elementary ranges is a range, and so the
difference (in absolute value) of the volumes of two elementary
ranges is itself an observed volume. Elementary ranges are also
R-complemented. That is, if v is the volume of an elementary range,
thenR−v must also be the volume of a range. This holds because the
complement of an elementary range is also a range. Note that the
range [1,N ] of maximum volume R may not be R-complemented;
however by convention and to avoid special cases later on, we shall
say that it is R-complemented.
In summary, the volumes of elementary ranges have the follow-
ing strong properties among the set of all volumes:
(1) Every volume occurs as the volume of an elementary range,
or the difference of the volumes of two elementary ranges.
(2) Conversely, the difference (in absolute value) of the volumes
of any two elementary ranges is a volume.
(3) If v < R is the volume of an elementary range, then R −v is
also a volume.
In fact, if we include 0 as the volume of an elementary range
(whether 0 was an observed volume or not), these properties imply
that the set of pairwise differences of the volumes of elementary
ranges is exactly the set of all volumes.
Building a graph. In order to exploit the previous three proper-
ties of elementary ranges, we build a graph as follows. The nodes
(a.k.a. vertices) of the graph are the R-complemented volumes. Two
nodes are connected by an edge iff their absolute difference is also
a volume; we label the edge by that difference. Property (3) implies
that elementary volumes must appear as nodes in the graph. Prop-
erty (1) implies that every volume must occur as a node or an edge
in the subgraph induced by the elementary volumes. Property (2)
means that every pair of elementary volumes must share an edge:
that is, the elementary volumes form a clique in the graph.
Algorithm overview. One natural approach is to build the graph
and run a clique-finding algorithm to identify elementary volumes.
Empirically, this approach suffices in some cases but has three
drawbacks. First, in many real-world datasets the edge density
of the graph is high and clique-finding does not terminate in a
reasonable time frame (recall that finding a maximum clique is NP-
complete). Second, in some cases the solution clique is not maximal,
and clique-finding would not suffice. Third, this approach does
not use Property (1). For these reasons, our algorithm uses generic
clique-finding only as a last resort.
Instead, we run a graph pre-processing phase, which exploits
both properties 1 and 2 to simultaneously identify nodes that must
be elementary volumes, named necessary nodes; and prune nodes
that cannot be elementary volumes, to progressively reduce a set of
candidate nodes. This step is iterated until the sets of necessary and
candidate nodes stabilize. Our experiments show that in many cases,
this pre-processing step suffices to identify the set of elementary
volumes. However, in the cases that it does not suffice, we then run
a clique-finding step that seeks to extend the set of necessary nodes
into a clique within the subset of candidate nodes while satisfying
properties 1 and 2.
We now explain the steps of our algorithm in detail.
3.1 Reconstruction Algorithm
The idea of our algorithm is to use the properties of elementary
ranges to identify their volumes among the set of all volumes. As
explained earlier, this information is then enough to reconstruct
database counts up to reflection (cf. Section 2). The main constraint
of our algorithm is that it requires the set of all volumes. In the
context of an adversary observing volume leakage, this means that
(in general) every range query must have been issued at least once.
Step 1: Obtaining the set of query volumes. The first step of
the algorithm is to collect all volumes. LetV be the set of all observed
volumes. We can bound the number of possible distinct volumes. If
the data is dense (i.e., each of theN values occurs at least once), then
N ≤ |V | ≤ N (N +1)/2. If the data is sparse (iff the volume 0 appears
in V ), then the number of values that appear in the database (with
non-zero counts) is at least Nmin
def
= −0.5 + 0.5 · √1 + 8 · (|V | − 1).
The query complexity of this step depends on the query distribu-
tion. No constraint on the query distribution is required, other than
the fact that every query should have non-zero probability. The
adversary does not need to know the query distribution. In princi-
ple, the adversary could even try to run the attack and see whether
it succeeds to determine whether all volumes have been observed
yet. If a query distribution is assumed, one can give bounds on the
number of queries necessary before all volumes have been collected
with high probability. This is discussed further in Section 3.2.
Step 2: Graph pre-processing. Given the set V of all possible
query volumes, we form an initial set of candidate elementary
volumes,Vcand. First, if the data was not dense (iff 0 appeared inV ),
then we remove it entirely from V for simplicity. Let Vcand be the
set containing R and all volumes that have an R-complement:
Vcand
def
= {R} ∪ {v ∈ V : R −v ∈ V } \ {0}.
This set will contain R, pairs of volumes, and maybe the singleton
volume R/2 if R is even and this volume was observed. This is the
initial set of nodes. It must contain the volumes of the elementary
ranges [1, 1] through [1,N − 1] because of their complementary
ranges [2,N ] through [N ,N ]. It must also contain the elementary
volume R for range [1,N ].
We place an edge between two node candidates iff their absolute
difference is an observed volume: the set of edges E is defined as
E
def
= {(v,v ′) ∈ Vcand ×Vcand :
v −v ′ ∈ V }.
Form the graph G = (Vcand,E) with node set Vcand and edge set E.
In the full version of this paper, we present an analytical model to
estimate the number of vertices and edges in the graph.
In this pre-processing step, we prune the set of nodes Vcand and
identify a set of nodes Vnec ⊆ Vcand that must be in the clique. We
present an example of graph-preprocessing in Figure 1. Subfigure (a)
shows the initial graph – for the moment, ignore its distinguished
nodes.
Let vmin be the smallest R-complemented volume. It must be
an elementary volume, up to reflection. Indeed the largest volume
strictly smaller than R can only be the volume of [1,N −1] or [2,N ],
since every other range strictly within [1,N ] is included in one
of those two ranges. It follows that the smallest R-complemented
volume is either the volume of [1, 1] or the volume of [N ,N ]. Since
we can only reconstruct the database up to reflection (cf. Section 2),
we break the reflection symmetry by assuming that it is the volume
of [1, 1] – which is correct up to reflection. In this respect, note that
by the reflection symmetry, in addition to the N -clique induced
by the volumes of queries [1, 1], [1, 2], . . . , [1,N ], the graph will
contain another N -clique generated by the volumes of the queries
[N ,N ], [N − 1,N ], . . . , [1,N ]; reconstruction up to reflection is
equivalent to recovering one of these two solutions.
Therefore, we initialize the set of necessary nodesVnec to contain
vmin and R. These two nodes are highlighted in subfigure (a) in the
example in Figure 1.
Next, we repeatedly perform the two following steps until they
do not yield changes in the sets Vcand and Vnec: (1) eliminate node
candidates that are not adjacent to all necessary nodes, and (2)
identify necessary nodes based on volumes that arise only as one
node candidate or edges incident to it.
Below, we briefly describe these two steps. For details of graph
pre-processing, see Algorithm 1 in Appendix B.
Eliminating candidate nodes: If any node in Vcand \ Vnec is
not adjacent to all nodes in Vnec, then it cannot be an elementary
volume, so remove it fromVcand. In the example in Figure 1, we see
in subfigure (b) that three nodes have been removed in this way.
Identifying necessary nodes: There are three ways to extend
the set of necessary nodes. First, if the set of node candidates is as
small as it can be (Nmin if the data is sparse, or N otherwise), then
all candidate nodes must be necessary (Vcand = Vnec). Second, if any
non-complemented volume arises only as edges incident to a single
non-necessary node candidate, then this node must correspond to
an elementary volume and is therefore added toVnec. In the example
in Figure 1, we see in subfigure (c) that nodes 4 and 19 have been
added to the set of necessary nodes because non-complemented
volume 15 arises only as an edge between them. Finally, if any non-
necessary node candidate arises only as itself or as edges incident
to itself, then it must correspond to an elementary volume and is
added to Vnec. We see in subfigure (c) that node 24 was added to
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(a) The largest observed
volume is R=27, so we ini-
tialize Vcand to the set of
R-complemented volumes and
Vnec to {vmin, R }={2, 27}.
2
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5
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24
25
27
(b) Eliminate candidate vol-
umes 3, 8, and 23 since they are
not adjacent to both nodes in
Vnec.
2
4
5
1922
24
25
27
(c) 4 and 19 are necessary since
15 arises only as their differ-
ence. 24 is necessary since it
does not arise as a difference
of candidate volumes, only as a
candidate volume itself.
2
4
19
24
27
(d) The number of nec-
essary volumes is N , so
pre-processing succeeded.
These elementary volumes
correspond to element counts
2, 2, 15, 5, 3 (or 3, 5, 15, 2, 2).
Figure 1: An example of pre-processing for a database with N = 5 distinct elements having counts 3, 5, 15, 2, and 2. The set of all possible
range query volumes is {2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27}. Nodes corresponding to necessary elementary volumes have thicker borders
and red shading.
the set of necessary nodes for this reason. The example finishes in
subfigure (d) when all remaining non-necessary candidate nodes
are removed since they are not adjacent to all of the necessary
nodes.
In Appendix B we prove a straightforward lemma that shows this
procedure is correct: it does not eliminate any elementary volumes
from the set of node candidates, and all necessary nodes correspond
to elementary volumes.
Step 3: Clique-finding. At this point, we have two sets of vol-
umes, Vnec and Vcand, satisfying Vnec ⊆ Velem ⊆ Vcand, and we
know a lower bound, Nmin, on the size of the clique formed by
Velem. As we will see when we present our experimental results,
when the data is dense, the pre-processing in Step 2 often found a
clique that generated all volumes inV (i.e., the sets it found satisfied
Vnec = Vcand). This is the case in the example of Figure 1. When that
is not the case, however, we must find a clique of size at least Nmin
in the graph induced by Vcand that generates exactly all volumes in
V . There may be multiple such cliques. Although the clique of the
elementary volumesVelem must be a subclique of a maximal clique,
it is not necessarily a subclique of a maximum clique (the largest
maximal clique).
Our approach is motivated by the following observation: since
the clique we want to find must include the nodes in Vnec, which
already form a clique, we can reduce our problem to finding the rest
of the clique in the subgraph of non-necessary candidate nodes –
that is, the subgraph induced byVcand \Vnec. This second part of the
clique must have the following properties. First, it must generate
all missing volumes – the volumes in V that do not arise as nodes
or edges in the subgraph induced byVnec – and no volumes outside
of V . The missing volumes could arise either as edges between
the nodes of this clique part, or as edges between its nodes and
the nodes in Vnec. Second, if the number of elementary volumes
is between Nmin and Nmax, then this clique part must have size
at least max{0,Nmin − |Vnec |} and at most Nmax − |Vnec |. Given
such a clique in the subgraph of non-necessary candidate nodes,
we recover the elementary volumes by combining it with Vnec.
Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 2 in Appendix B. Algorithm 2
returns a set of lists of volumes that (1) include vmin, (2) have size
between Nmin and Nmax, (3) generate exactly the volumes inV and
no others, and (4) are not supersets of any other list of volumes
in the returned solution. This set of lists of volumes must include
Velem, or a subset of Velem if the data was sparse. See Lemma B.2
for the full statement of correctness.
3.2 Analysis of the Algorithm
Time complexity. The pre-processing step increases Vnec or de-
creases Vcand at each step; since there are at most N (N + 1)/2
volumes, it follows that this step iterates O(N 2) times. The bulk of
the time complexity comes if clique-finding is run.
Finding maximal cliques. In general, a graph on n nodes can
have an exponential number of maximal cliques [19] – this clearly
seems incompatible with our goal of practical reconstruction at-
tacks.When the number of nodes is small, however, it is still feasible
to enumerate all of the maximal cliques with an algorithm such
as Bron–Kerbosch [2]. For larger domains, there exist logarithmic
time algorithms to sample one maximal clique at a time [17].
Finding minimal subcliques. In the worst case, if the data is not
dense, the check on line 40 inMin_Subcliqes in Algorithm 2 will
be carried out for 2 |Vk | − 1 subcliques. In Section 3.3, we evalu-
ate a variant that either returns all subcliques, not just minimal
subcliques, or fails if it is impractical to do so.
Query complexity. We must assume something about the dis-
tribution to analyze the query complexity of collecting all vol-
umes. In the case of a uniform query distribution, this is the clas-
sic coupon collector’s problem; because there are O(N 2) possible
queries, coupon collection implies that O(N 2 logN ) queries suffice
(and the constants are small).
For a non-uniform distribution, if the least likely range has proba-
bility αN (N+1)/2 , then a straightforward adaptation of coupon collec-
tion analysis shows that O(α−1N 2 logN ) queries suffice. Comput-
ing coupon collector bounds for arbitrary distributions is straight-
forward, but somewhat tedious: Flajolet et al. [8] give a generating
function for it. They also give a closed-form solution for one dis-
tribution of practical importance, namely the standard Zipf [25]
distribution (where the k-th most likely element has probability
proportional to 1/k). Somewhat surprisingly, their results imply
that even if the query distribution is Zipf the query complexity of
collecting all volumes is only O(N 2 log2 N ). This means that even
with a very skewed distribution the query complexity of our attack
is not much higher than with a uniform distribution.
Analytical model. In the full version of this paper, we build
an analytical model of the graph underpinning the algorithm to
provide insight into its behavior.We assume the records are sampled
i.i.d. from a fixed distribution. The database counts then follow
a multinomial distribution, which can be modelled (with only a
factor of 2 loss in some cases [18]) by a series of independent
Poisson variables. Because a sum of Poisson variables is itself a
Poisson variable, the number of records matching any given range
is also a Poisson variable. Using properties of the difference of
Poisson variables, we can then approximate the collision probability
between volumes, and ultimately compute estimates of the number
of distinct volumes, nodes, and edges in the graph.
To compute concrete bounds we assume the database distribu-
tion is uniform. We show that the number of volume collisions
can be approximated by N 3/(4√πR) and our experiments support
this estimate. In particular, having no volume collision whatsoever
would require R = Ω(N 6), which is only reasonable for very low
values of N . This shows the importance of using algorithms that
are resilient to the fact that volumes do collide, and hence do not
in general identify a unique range; as is the case of our algorithm.
We also show that the ratio R/N 2 relates both to the ratio of
collisions among volumes, and to the edge density of the graph,
suggesting that it is a critical quantity for assessing the success of
our algorithm. Our experiments show that when this ratio is 1/2 or
more, our algorithm typically succeeds easily (even on non-uniform
age data), while when it is much lower than 1/2 it typically fails.
Furthermore if we model the graph as a random graph, as far
as its clique number is concerned (and disregarding the existence
of the two N -cliques stemming from elementary ranges), then we
show that for the two solution cliques stemming from elemen-
tary volumes to be of maximum size among all cliques (and hence
uniquely identifiable as such), it should be the case that R = Ω(N 2).
We refer the reader to the full version of this paper for more details.
3.3 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation of the re-
construction attack from the previous section. We simulate an at-
tacker who has observed enough queries to see all possible volumes
of range queries. We implemented our algorithms in Python and
used the graph-tool [21] and NetworkX [12] packages for finding
cliques or maximal independent vertex sets.
Datasets and methodology. We test our algorithm on various
attributes from three years of medical records from the US govern-
ment’s Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Nationwide
Inpatient Sample (NIS). The attributes we chose to extract have
domain sizes that range from N = 4 to N = 366 and they are
all attributes on which range queries are meaningful. For more
information about these datasets and how we extracted attributes,
see Appendix C. Each of the three years includes patient discharge
records from about 1000 hospitals, giving us 3000 datasets for most
attributes. (Some were not available in all years.)
We say the attack succeeds if there is a single solution output
by Algorithm 2, and it is the set of elementary volumes (up to
reflection). For dense datasets (where every value appears at least
once and no range query has volume 0), this means that all element
counts have been recovered exactly, up to reflection. For sparse
datasets, this means that all non-zero element counts have been
recovered in order (up to reflection), but it is not known which
elements did not appear in the database – the attacker must make
a decision about which values were not observed. In our evaluation
of step 2, we discuss and evaluate one such strategy, which uses a
small amount of auxiliary information, for assigning the recovered
counts to a subset of elements in the domain in the sparse case.
Step 1 evaluation. The first step of the attack is to observe
enough queries to see all possible range query volumes. The num-
ber of queries that this entails depends on the query distribution,
as discussed in Section 3.2. For instance, if the query distribution is
uniform, then the expected number of queries is O(N 2 logN ).
Step 2 evaluation. For each dataset-attribute combination, we
ran Algorithm 1 to obtain sets of necessary elementary volumes,
Vnec, and candidate elementary volumes, Vcand. The plot in Fig-
ure 2 shows, for each attribute, the average1 number of datasets for
which pre-processing was sufficient for the attack to succeed. For
all attributes except AGE and AGEDAY, pre-processing correctly
identified the non-zero element counts in order (up to reflection)
for the vast majority of datasets. The difference in patterns on the
bars indicates which datasets were dense. Attributes with smaller
domain sizes, e.g., AMONTH, MRISK, SEV, and ZIPINC, were dense
most of the time. The attributes with the largest domain, LOS and
AGEDAY, were dense in fewer than 0.01% of datasets.
Pre-processing recovered the set of elementary volumes for at
least 90% of all dense datasets for each attribute except AGEDAY.
This attribute had a single dense dataset in each 2004 and 2008 that
required clique-finding.
For sparse datasets, recovering the set of all non-zero counts
provides a lot of information. Combining it with some rudimentary
information about the database distribution can lead to recovering
all element counts, just like in the dense case. For instance, one
might guess that the length of stay (LOS), the number of chronic
conditions (NCHRONIC), and the number of procedures (NPR),
might be 0 most frequently, then decrease. To illustrate just how
valuable knowing the set of elementary volumes could be when
combined with a tiny bit of knowledge about the domain, we evalu-
ate the following strategy for assigning counts to elements: simply
1For attributes that were available in more than one year (as noted in Figure 7 in
Appendix C), results were very similar, so we averaged the counts.
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Pre-processing results by attribute and data density
Figure 2: Pre-processing success and data density by attribute.
guess that they correspond to the first values in the domain. The
results are displayed in Figure 3. We juxtapose the success of our
simple strategy for LOS, NCHRONIC, and NPR with its mediocre re-
sults for the number of diagnoses, NDX, which is 1 more frequently
than 0, and thus our strategy is not suitable for it.
Step 3 evaluation. Lastly, we ran Algorithm 2 (with some mod-
ifications) on the few dataset-attribute combinations for which
pre-processing did not find a unique solution. First, we modified
Get_Elem_Volumes to return all solutions, not just minimal ones,
by replacingMin_Subcliqes on line 20 with All_Subcliqes_P
(described starting on line 15 in Alg. 3 in Appendix B). However, for
the sake of a more practical attack, we allowedGet_Elem_Volumes
to return an incomplete list of solutions, or to fail entirely.
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Figure 3: Extending pre-processing success for sparse datasets. The
fraction of correct values is out of the actual number of values for
each dataset.
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Figure 4: Overall results of the practical reconstruction attack.
Our probabilistic variant of Find_Maximal_Cliqes is described
starting on line 1 of Algorithm 3. Specifically, line 14 of Algorithm 2
is replaced with Find_Maximal_Cliqes_P(CANDnn ,Mmin,V ).
For graphs with 20 or fewer nodes, we used the find_cliques rou-
tine from the NetworkX Pythonmodule (line 4) [12]. For graphswith
more nodes, we sampled maximal cliques one at a time, 1000 times,
(line 7) using Luby’s efficient parallel algorithm for maximal inde-
pendent sets, implemented as the max_independent_vertex_set
routine from the graph-tool Python module [21].
The three ways in which our variant may fail entirely are (i)
Find_Maximal_Cliqes_P fails to find any maximal cliques of size
at leastMmin (line 11), (ii) we found such cliques, but none of them
generated the set of missing volumes (line 13), or (iii) there were
such cliques that generated the set of missing volumes, but for all
of them, it was impractical (line 17) to find all of their subclique
solutions.
Figure 4 shows the overall attack results. Success, in green, occurs
when pre-processing or clique-finding finds the solution and it is
unique – there is a single clique whose size is in the right range that
generates all observed volumes. Multiple cliques, in blue, arise when
clique-finding has found all such solutions, but there is more than
one, so that the correct solution cannot be precisely determined.
Failure, in red, arises either when Algorithm 2 returns FAILURE or
{} or when we sampled maximal cliques using Luby’s algorithm
(line 7) and may not have found all of them.
In our experiments, the most common reason for failure overall
was (iii): it was impractical to find all subcliques (about 60% of
failures or incomplete cases). The second most common overall
reason for failure was (ii), not finding any cliques that generated all
missing volumes (about 36%). However, as onemight expect because
of the bound on line 17 in All_Subcliqes_P, the attributes with
fewer possible values (e.g., AGE with N = 91 compared to AGEDAY
with N = 365) failed more often due to no cliques generating all
volumes as opposed to too-big cliques.
Conclusions. Overall, our experiments indicate that our clique-
finding approach yields overwhelming success in reconstructing
counts of dense datasets – and that in most cases, no expensive
clique-finding is even required (see the white bars corresponding to
dense data in Fig. 2). For sparse data, the success of this approach
mainly depends on what auxiliary information is available to the
attacker. We showed how an attacker can leverage rudimentary
knowledge of a distribution (e.g., that the most frequent values are
the smallest) to correctly assign exact counts to values (see Fig. 3).
4 UPDATE RECOVERY ATTACK
In this section, we consider an attack in the following setting. We
assume that the adversary knows the database counts, via either
the reconstruction attack from the previous section or a one-time
compromise of the database. Now suppose that a new record is
added into the database, and that the attacker learns this. The
attacker could detect such an update for example because an update
query may have a different volume than a range query; the attacker
could also infer indirectly that an update has occured because he
observes volumes that were not possible for the original database
counts. In this context, we propose an attack to recover the value
of the newly added record using only the volume leakage of range
queries issued after the update.
Note that in order to fully recover the value of the new record, the
attack assumes that enough range queries are issued by the client
before any further update is made. Thus the attack as it stands will
fail if updates are made in close succession. We leave the treatment
of frequent or simultaneous updates for future work.
On the other hand, if there are enough range queries for our
attack to fully recover the value of a new record after it is added,
and before the next update, then database counts are fully known
before the next update. It follows that the attack can be repeated
for the next update. Thus if database updates are rare relative to
range queries, then the attack allows an adversary to update its
view of database counts on the fly as updates are made.
As a first idea to recover the value of the new record, one could
re-run the database reconstruction attack and compare the original
and new counts. This has unnecessarily high query complexity—our
attack in this section is orders of magnitude more efficient analyti-
cally and experimentally.
Like our main attack, our update recovery algorithm does not
require a uniform query distribution. If we do make that assump-
tion for the purpose of analysis, then the algorithm is amenable
to analysis in the same model as our main attack. Recall that in
that model, our main attack required O(N 2 logN ) queries for full
reconstruction. In the same model, our update recovery algorithm
only requires O(N ) queries to recover the value of the new record
exactly. Furthermore the same algorithm is able to approximate
the value of the new record quite quickly: our model predicts that
the value of the new record can be approximated within an addi-
tive error ϵN , for any ϵ > 0, after observing O(1/ϵ) queries; once
again the observed behavior in our experiments on real-world data
matches this prediction.
4.1 Update Recovery Algorithm
The idea of the attack is as follows. First, because the adversary
knows all database counts for the original database, it knows the
volume of every range query on that database. Now suppose that a
new record is added, and the adversary then observes the volume
of some range query.
Assume that the volume of that query is not equal to the volume
of any range for the original database (i.e. before the record was
added). Then it must be the case that the queried range has matched
the new record. The adversary can detect this, since it knows the
volume of every query for the original database, as noted earlier.
Since the query has matched the new record, its volume must be
one more than the volume of some range in the original database.
If that range is unique, once again the adversary knows this, and
can deduce the queried range [x ,y]. In that case the adversary can
immediately deduce that the value of the new record must lie within
[x ,y]. A similar reasoning holds in the case that the observed range
does not contain the new record.
As the volumes ofmore range queries are observed, the adversary
refines its knowledge of the new record’s value. We note that the
previous reasoning required an assumption about a certain volume
corresponding to a unique queried range in the original database.
As both experiments and analysis will show however, this event
occurs often enough that the algorithm is able to quickly home in
on the value of the new record.
For space reasons, the pseudo-code of the attack (Algorithm 4) is
given in Appendix B. The input of the algorithm is a set of volumes
V , which should be the number of matching records (i.e. volume) of
a set of observed queries; the original database countsC , whereC(k)
is the number of records with value k ; and the number of values N .
The algorithm creates a table “RangeFromVol” mapping volumes
to ranges for the original counts C , then proceeds to refine the set
“Possible” of possible values for the new record as new volumes
are observed, according to the algorithm explained in the previous
paragraph. The algorithm finally outputs a guess for the value of
the new record, which is simply the average of the minimum and
maximum of the set of possible values obtained up to that point
(this choice minimizes worst-case error). We preferred clarity in
the pseudocode; many refinements are possible. Our experiments
show that this simple algorithm is already quite effective.
Our analysis of the attack’s query complexity appears in the
full version for space reasons. Within the same analytical model
as in Section 3.2, we show that assuming R = Ω(N 2), the expected
number of queries for exact recovery is O(N ), and the expected
number of queries to recover the value of the new record within
ϵN is O(1/ϵ), where the constants depend on N /√R.
4.2 Experiments
We have run Algorithm 4 on the age data of patients in three
hospitals of sizes within 10% ofR = 5000, 10000 and 20000, extracted
from the same HCUP data as in Section 3.3. The age data is capped
at 90 in our dataset for privacy reasons, and so the number of values
is N = 91. Thus the choices of sizes 5000, 10000 and 20000 reflect
the cases where R is respectively close toN 2/2,N 2 and 2N 2. Update
recovery should work well in parameter regimes when the main
Precision
R 20% 10% 5% 2% Exact
5000 47 79 123 229 974
10000 18 29 46 99 391
20000 11 17 27 57 191
Figure 5:Median number of queries needed to achieve the given pre-
cision in the output of Algorithm 4, for three hospitals with size
within 10% of the given R.
reconstruction attack works well: around R ≥ N 2/2. Effectiveness
should degrade gracefully below that value.
If R is close to N 2/2 or below, it may happen in that most or all
ranges that would allow to uniquely identify the value of the new
record could collide with other volumes; in that case exact recovery
could be very expensive or impossible. If recovery is impossible,
the average number of queries required for recovery is technically
infinite. Obviously, an infinite average does not reflect the fact that
in practice, recovery should usually succeed with a low number of
queries. For this reason we use medians instead of averages.
Results are given in Figure 5. As predicted by our model, the
number of queries needed for exact recovery is of the order of
magnitude of a reasonably small multiple of N , although the con-
stant degrades when R approaches N 2/2. The number of queries
necessary to achieve a precision ϵ does appear to behave asO(1/ϵ).
Furthermore, the value of the new record can be approximated
reasonably well within relatively few queries, especially for larger
R: for R = 20000 we see that observing the volume of 27 queries
suffices to recover the value of the new record within an error of
5%, i.e. within 5 years.
5 RANGE QUERY RECONSTRUCTION VIA
CDF MATCHING
In Section 3, we described an attack that achieves database recon-
struction from the volumes of unknown queries. Once the database
has been reconstructed, the queries themselves can also be recon-
structed from their volumes by matching an observed volume to
the set of possible queries that have that volume. Thus, one generic
approach to query reconstruction is to observe enough volumes
to reconstruct the database using the previous attack, then simply
match queries to volumes using the reconstructed database. In the
full version of this work we confirm experimentally that this at-
tack is very effective. A drawback of this approach is that many
queries must be observed before any information is learned about
any queries. If an attacker wants to learn as much as it can from a
set of queries of any size, a different approach is needed.
In this section, we describe an attack that achieves query re-
construction “online”, meaning the adversary can infer a set of
likely underlying values for the query as soon as it observes its
corresponding volume. We call this attack “CDF matching”. CDF
matching uses an estimate of the database distribution (below, an
“auxiliary distribution”) to infer the underlying (hidden) query as
soon as its volume is observed. Various works [11, 20] have argued
that attacks with auxiliary distributions are realistic; such distribu-
tions can come from census data [1], public employee records [11],
or even copies of similar databases posted online by hackers.
First, we will describe the attack and analyze it in the setting
where the adversary has full knowledge of the database distribution.
Then, we will demonstrate empirically that (1) the attack reveals a
substantial amount of information about queries, and (2) our analy-
sis retains much of its predictive power even when the adversary
has a poor auxiliary distribution.
Preliminaries. Before describing our attack we will state and dis-
cuss two useful technical tools. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
distance between CDFs F and G is KS(F ,G) = supx |F (x) −G(x)|.
Let Ib is 1 if b = 1 and 0 otherwise. The Dvoretzky-Kiefer-
Wolfowitz (DKW) inequality [6] is a Chernoff-type bound on
the maximum distance between the empirical and true CDF of a
distribution.
Theorem 5.1 (Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz). Let πDB be a
distribution on [1,N ], and X1, . . . ,XR be R i.i.d. samples from πDB.
Let Fˆ (i) = 1R
∑R
j=1 IX j ≤i and F (i) =
∑i
j=1 pi for i ∈ [1,N ]. Then
Pr
[
supi
Fˆ (i) − F (i) > ϵ ] ≤ 2e−2Rϵ 2 .
This is a useful result for several reasons. First, it implies con-
vergence for volumes of range queries, since the volume of every
query [i, j] can be written R · (Fˆ (j)− Fˆ (i−1)). It is also a uniform con-
vergence bound, meaning its guarantees apply to all range queries
simultaneously. Finally, its rate of convergence is nearly as fast as
a single Chernoff bound, though it applies to many events at once.
5.1 The CDF Matching Attack
First define some notation. Let the number of records in the database
be R. Let πDB = (p1, . . . ,pN ) be a distribution over [1,N ], and R
the set of all range queries on [1,N ]. We model the database as a
sequence of R i.i.d. samples X1, . . . ,XR from πDB. For any query
q = [a,b], define VDB (q) = ∑Ri=1 Ia≤Xi ≤b and Pr [ q ] = ∑ℓ∈q pℓ .
Let our attack be represented by the adversaryA. For any query
q, A takes as input πDB,R,VDB (q), and the confidence parameter
0 < δ < 1. The adversary A first computes a precision ϵ with the
property that
Pr
 supq′∈R
VDB (q′)R − ∑ℓ∈q′ pℓ
 ≤ ϵ
 ≥ 1 − δ
using the DKW inequality, as ϵ =
√
(2 log 2δ )/R. The adversary A
then outputs Qˆ =
{
q′ ∈ R : | Pr [ q′ ] − VDB (q)R | ≤ ϵ
}
.
We will measure success on two axes: (1) raw accuracy, which
measures whether the true query is in the candidate set Qˆ , and (2)
uncertainty reduction, which measures the size of Qˆ (where smaller
Qˆs reduce the attacker’s uncertainty more). There are many ways to
refine the CDF matching attack, such as using constraints on query
volumes. One such constraint is that for two volumes v1 < v2, the
querywith volumev2 cannot be contained in the querywith volume
v1. Such refinements would increase reconstruction accuracy but
would make the attack “offline”, so we leave it to future work.
Analysis. Next we turn to analyzing the performance of the CDF
matching attack. With the DKW inequality as a tool, it is straight-
forward to put tight analytical bounds on these two performance
metrics in an ideal query reconstruction setting where the adver-
sary has precise knowledge of the database distribution and the
database is sampled i.i.d. The following theorem lower-bounds raw
accuracy and can be proven via a simple application of DKW.
Theorem 5.2. Let πDB = (p1, . . . ,pN ) be a distribution on [1,N ],
and let R be the set of all intervals of [1,N ]. Let DB = X1, . . . ,XR
be R i.i.d. samples from πDB. For a range query q = [i, j] on [1,N ],
define Pr [ q ] = ∑j
ℓ=i pℓ and VDB (q) =
∑R
k=1 Ii≤Xk ≤j . Let A be an
adversary which on input πDB,R,VDB (q) and 0 < δ < 1 computes
ϵ =
√
(2 log 2δ )/R and outputs Qˆ as defined above. Define Err to be
the event, over the random coins used to sample DB, ∃q ∈ R | (q <
A(πDB,R,VDB (q),δ )). Then Pr [ Err ] ≤ δ .
This theorem implies that an adversary that chooses its candidate
set in CDF matching via the DKW inequality has perfect raw accu-
racy except with probability δ . Even with an inaccurate auxiliary
distribution, Theorem 5.2 and other results of this form are likely
to hold as long as the KS distance between the true distribution and
the adversary’s auxiliary distribution is low.
Next we present a theorem on the uncertainty reduction of the
CDF matching attack. Uncertainty reduction measures the number
of queries which could correspond to an observed volume. Intu-
itively, uncertainty about the underlying query of an observed
volume is related to the number of queries whose probabilities are
“close” to the real query. Since the proof is a simple application of
the DKW inequality, we elide it.
Theorem 5.3. Let πDB = (p1, . . . ,pN ) be a distribution on [1,N ],
and let R be the set of all intervals of [1,N ]. Let DB = X1, . . . ,XR
be R i.i.d. samples from πDB. For a range query q = [i, j] on [1,N ],
define Pr [ q ] = ∑j
ℓ=i pℓ and VDB (q) =
∑R
k=1 Ii≤Xk ≤j . For any
query q, 0 < δ < 1, and ϵ =
√
(2 log 2δ )/R define Cq = {q′ ∈
R | |Pr [ q ] − Pr [ q′ ]| ≤ 2ϵ} and CSq = {q′ ∈ R | | Pr [ q′ ] −
(VDB (q)/R)| ≤ ϵ} (Note that the Cq is fixed by πDB,δ ,R while CSq
is a random variable.) Define CS to be the event, over the random
coins used to sample DB,
⋃
q∈R |CSq | > |Cq |. Then Pr [ CS ] ≤ δ .
This theorem is useful because it relates the size of the candidate
set for a query to the number of other queries whose expected
volumes are close in probability. Further, we can quantify the rate
at which the candidate set gets smaller as the number of records
increases.
5.2 Experimental Results
We performed two types of experiments to assess the risk of query
reconstruction. The first type assumes the exact count of each
element in the database is known, either because the database was
stolen or the attacker observed enough queries to run the clique-
finding algorithm described above. For space reasons, a description
of the exact procedure and the results appear in the full version of
this paper.
The second type of experiment evaluates the CDF matching al-
gorithm using the attributes described in Figure 7 of Appendix C.
In each experiment, we took the individual hospital records for that
attribute for a particular year’s HCUP data to be the targets of the
attack. We used the aggregate counts of a different year of HCUP
data as the auxiliary data. We ran experiments with different com-
binations of auxiliary data and target hospitals for the HCUP years
2004, 2008, 2009 and 2013. Surprisingly, both the performance of
the experiments and the median KS distance between the auxiliary
distribution and the target hospitals varied only a small amount
between different experiments for an attribute, so for simplicity of
exposition we will only present one experiment for each.
An individual experiment performs the following steps: first,
we compute the number of records R in the target hospital. Then
we compute the epsilon given by the DKW inequality for R and
δ = 0.05. Then for each query in the target hospital, we compute
the set of candidate queries Qˆ as described above. Figure 6 shows
the median raw recovery rate (i.e. the median fraction of times the
correct query is in Qˆ) broken down by the sizes of the sets Qˆ . The
set sizes are relative to the total number of queries for each attribute
(given in Figure 7); to save spacewe omit converting the percentages
to absolute sizes. Roughly, the total height of each bar is the median
fraction of correct predictions (of any size) and the different patterns
on each bar report how much reduction in uncertainty each correct
prediction gives the adversary (where a smaller number means
the size of Qˆ is smaller, and the adversary’s uncertainty is reduced
more).With precise knowledge of the database distribution and i.i.d.
samples, the median raw recovery rate would be 100% except with
probability 0.05. With no knowledge at all, the “baseline guessing”
attack would simply set Qˆ to be all possible queries. On this graph,
this would be a bar with the 100% pattern going from 0.0 to 1.0.
Discussion. The raw recovery rate varied widely between differ-
ent attributes. For the two largest attributes (AGEDAY and LOS)
almost every set Qˆ contained the correct query. However, both
attributes have an extremely skewed distribution, so for almost
all queries Qˆ contained almost every possible query. Thus, the “re-
construction” achieved for most queries is not better than baseline
guessing. The attack performed well on AMONTH, and there the
sets Qˆ were much smaller—over 30% of the recovered queries had
|Qˆ | ≤ 8. The auxiliary data was quite good for AMONTH: the
median KS distance was only 0.02.
The results for NDX, NPR, and NCHRONIC are more surprising.
All three had relatively large median KS distances, but a substantial
fraction (around 15%) of all queries were correctly recovered and
had small |Qˆ |. For NDX and NPR, around 15% of queries were recov-
ered and had |Qˆ | ≤ 14, and for NCHRONIC around 10% of queries
had |Qˆ | ≤ 35. The overall recovery rate was high as well. AGE
also had many correctly-recovered queries with small Qˆ , despite a
high KS distance. In fact, in more than 80% of hospitals there were
correctly-recovered queries with |Qˆ | ≤ 15, which corresponds to
only 0.4% of possible range queries! Despite having a poor auxiliary
distribution, for all these attributes the attack was able to recover
fine-grained information about many queries. Further, the analysis
(in particular Theorem 5.2), which formally only holds when the
auxiliary distribution is nearly perfect, is still partially predictive
for accuracy in a noisy setting.
The conclusions we draw from these experiments are twofold:
(1) simple query reconstruction attacks can reveal fine-grained
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Figure 6: Results of CDF matching experiments on HCUP attributes. The number appearing below each attribute is the median across all
hospitals of the KS distance between an individual hospital and the auxiliary distribution. The percentage corresponding to each bar pattern
is the proportion of queries in the set Qˆ for the correct predictions; thus, smaller numbers are better.
information about queries and damage privacy even in practical
settings and with poor auxiliary data, and (2) idealized models of
these attacks proven under seemingly strong assumptions (such
as perfect auxiliary data or i.i.d. samples) maintain much of their
predictive power when these assumptions are violated.
Database reconstruction. If enough queries are reconstructed
with high accuracy, it is possible to reconstruct the database as well.
If we write each query q = [a,b] as a 0-1 row vector where qi = 1
if a ≤ i ≤ b and zero otherwise, the database DB (a vector with
N components whose sum is R) is the solution to the system of
linear equations Q · DB = ®v where Q is a matrix of row vectors for
each query, and ®vi is the volume of the ith query. Of course, one
can use the attack from Section 3 to reconstruct the database; the
advantage of this approach is that it requires far fewer queries. We
leave a more detailed treatment to future work.
6 COUNTERMEASURES
In this section we briefly discuss some possible countermeasures to
our attacks. There are two basic kinds of countermeasures: client
processing and adding noise.
Volume information can be hidden if the client does some ad-
ditional processing of queries and results. If instead of issuing a
single query, the client batches several queries together, the volume
of any individual query will not be revealed. If queries are infre-
quent, this could incur a high latency penalty. Another approach
is putting a lower limit on the width of a range query. If the client
wants to query a small range, it queries a larger range and filters
the unneeded results locally. This incurs bandwidth overhead, but
may be feasible in some settings. The database could be bucketed,
meaning records which are close in value are treated as one logical
“value” for the purposes of retrieval [13]. Bucketing would not gen-
erally prevent reconstruction, but would ensure the exact counts
of individual elements are not revealed.
Adding noise to the volumes can be done by adding dummy
records to the database, incurring server storage overhead. It seems
inherent that the security benefit is directly related to the stor-
age overhead: a small number of dummy records (yielding low
storage overhead) will give little or no security benefit. One prin-
cipled way of adding dummy records is using differential privacy
(DP), as suggested by KKNO in a follow-up work [15]. Rather than
querying the database directly, they query the output of a DP mech-
anism for range queries. Intuitively, the DP mechanism prevents
reconstruction of the exact count of every element in the database.
Crucially, their guarantees do not extend to query reconstruction:
while query reconstruction should be less accurate, no formal guar-
antee precludes accurate query reconstruction. Since a thorough
examination of DP countermeasures would be quite involved, we
leave it to future work.
7 RELATEDWORK
Aside from KKNO, there are two recent works on reconstruction
attacks which are related to ours. The first is by Cash et al. [3], who
present an attack for revealing keyword search queries on natural-
language documents based on the number of results returned. Their
sole attack in the volume-only setting requires perfect knowledge
of the documents in the database and simply matches an observed
volume with the query having that count. Our query reconstruction
attack with exact counts (discussed in Section 5) can be seen as a
version of their count attack.
The other recent paper related to our attacks is by Lacharité et
al. [16]. Their auxiliary data attack is similar in some ways to the
CDF matching attack in Section 5. They target full reconstruction,
assuming both access pattern and rank leakage, but do not provide
a formal analysis. In contrast, our CDF matching attack targets
query reconstruction with fewer assumptions. Moreover, it is ac-
companied by an analysis which gives tight theoretical guarantees
and maintains its predictive ability even if the auxiliary data is
inaccurate.
In the security community, communication volume and other
traffic features like packet timings have long been used to perform
traffic analysis and website fingerprinting attacks. For example,
Wright et al. [24] recovered spoken phrases from encrypted VoIP
traffic by training a model on packet sizes and timings. Both the
settings and goals of these works are distinct from ours; in particular
they rely on information that is not available in our setting.
Some countermeasures for communication volume leakage exist.
For example, IPSec has an optional “Traffic Flow Confidentiality”
mode that adds padding. TLS 1.3 and SSH also allow packets to be
padded. These countermeasures are not widely used in practice,
both because they are usually too expensive to deploy in large sys-
tems and because prior work [7] has shown the overall usefulness
of these countermeasures is quite low.
In a recent follow-up [15] to their reconstruction attacks, KKNO
combine ORAM and differential privacy with the goal of preventing
database reconstruction attacks based on either access pattern or
communication volume. We discuss this work in Section 6.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this work we demonstrate practical reconstruction attacks which
use only volume leakage. In the context of encrypted databases,
it is worth noting that while ORAM protects against attacks that
require access pattern leakage, it remains vulnerable to volume
attacks. Given the rich volume information that can be recovered
from a database snapshot [10], one unavoidable and surprising
conclusion of this work is that ORAM by itself is insufficient to
argue security even against reconstruction attacks carried out by
a snapshot attacker. An empirical study of whether our attacks
can be carried out using only a database snapshot is an interesting
direction for future work.
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A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF KKNO
RECONSTRUCTION ATTACKS
In this appendix we reproduce, for completeness, the reconstruction
attacks presented in [14]. We also give some evidence that it is
difficult (or perhaps even impossible) to adapt to non-uniform query
distributions, and conclude by noting some surprising limitations
of KKNO’s attack.
A.1 KKNO’s Factorization Attack
Suppose the database contains R records with values val1 ≤ val2 ≤
. . . ≤ valR in {1, . . . ,N }. For ease of notation, define val0 B 0
and valR+1 B N + 1. Define the distance dk between the kth and
(k + 1)st records as dk B valk+1 − valk . Let uk be the number
of distinct queries matching k records, for any 0 ≤ k ≤ R. (Note
that since there are only N (N + 1)/2 distinct queries, at most this
many uk ’s can be non-zero.) The uk ’s then satisfy the following
equations:
uR = d0 · dR
uR−1 = d0 · dR−1 + d1 · dR
...
uR−m =
m∑
k=0
dk · dR−(m−k )
...
u1 = d0 · d1 + d1 · d2 + . . . + dR−1 · dR
u0 = 1/2
( R∑
k=0
dk
2 − (N + 1)
)
The key observation from KKNO’s work is that if queries are uni-
formly distributed, then it is possible to determine the uk ’s by
observing enough queries, after which it is possible to construct
a polynomial that can be factored into two polynomials whose
coefficients are the dk ’s. That polynomial is
F (x) = uR + . . . + u1 · xR−1 + uˆ0 · xR + u1 · xR+1 + . . . + uR · x2R ,
where the coefficient of xR is not u0, but uˆ0 B 2 · u0 + N + 1. The
polynomial can then be factored into two degree-R polynomials,
specifically, F (x) = d(x) · dr (x), where
d(x) = d0 + d1 · x + . . . + dR · xR , and
dr (x) = dR + dR−1 · x + . . . + d0 · xR .
Polynomial F may not have a unique factorisation into factors
of this form, in which case KKNO’s algorithm picks one of the
possibilities arbitrarily.
The first step of the attack is to observe enough queries to deter-
mine the uk ’s. Let ck be the number of queries (out of the observed
Q queries) that have volume k , for any k between 0 and R. Then as
the number of queries Q grows, the quantity ck/Q gets arbitrarily
close to uk · 1N (N+1)/2 , and therefore it is possible to solve for the
uk ’s and proceed with constructing and factorizing F (x). KKNO
show that the approach we just sketched correctly recovers all uk ’s
after Ω(N 4 logN ) queries, except with inverse polynomial (in N )
probability. Note that this attack can also cope with some di values
being zero.
A.2 KKNO for Non-Uniform Query
Distributions
The assumption that the query distribution is uniform is inherent to
KKNO’s algorithm; without such an assumption, it is not clear how
to determine theuk ’s from the ck ’s. In fact, with non-uniform query
distributions, it is sometimes not possible to uniquely determine
the uk ’s. Consider the following example with N = 3, R = 3, and
query distribution as follows:
Pr ([1, 1]) = 1/4 Pr ([1, 2]) = 1/6 Pr ([1, 3]) = 1/6
Pr ([2, 2]) = 1/8 Pr ([2, 3]) = 1/8
Pr ([3, 3]) = 1/6.
Suppose that after sufficiently many queries Q have been observed,
the counts are as follows:
c0/Q = 1/6 c1/Q = 1/4 c2/Q = 1/4 c3/Q = 1/3.
In this case, it is impossible to distinguish whether the element
counts are {1, 2, 0} (or the reflection {0, 2, 1}) or {2, 1, 0} (or the
reflection {0, 1, 2}). Note that with a uniform query distribution,
KKNO’s algorithm would have succeeded in both cases since the
corresponding polynomials factor into unique pairs of degree-3
polynomials:
F1(x) = 2 + 2x + x2 + 6x3 + x4 + 2x5 + 2x6
= (x3 + x2 + 2)(2x3 + x + 1), and
F2(x) = 2 + x + 2x2 + 6x3 + 2x4 + x5 + 2x6
= (x3 + x + 2)(2x3 + x2 + 1).
Impossibility of perfectly correct reconstruction. Interest-
ingly, even under KKNO’s precise assumptions about the query
distribution, there are databases that cannot be reconstructed (even
up to reflection). This is because the function that takes a database
and outputs its ui values is not injective—there are databases on
which this function collides! This implies, surprisingly, that the
most natural notion of correctness for reconstruction attacks (that
for a fixed database, as the number of observed queries goes to in-
finity, the attack should be able to reconstruct up to reflection with
probability 1) is impossible to achieve when the query distribution
is uniform, because there are some distinct databases that generate
the same set of volumes. We implemented a simple brute-force
experiment that computes the ui values and runs KKNO’s attack
on every possible database where N = 17 and with 2 ≤ R ≤ 15.
With R = 15 there are just over 300 million possible databases, and
KKNO failed due to ui collision on 49,000 of them. Here are two
databases which have the same ui values:
{0, 0, 0, 3, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 6, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1}
{1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}
We found ui collisions on dense databases as well. Understand-
ing this phenomenon seems to be a difficult but interesting com-
binatorics question which we leave to future work. The theory
of Golomb rulers may give some insight here—observe that two
databases whose elementary volumes are Golomb rulers (i.e. sets of
numbers that generate every possible value below some threshold
via pairwise subtraction) can never be distinguished from volume
alone.
B DESCRIPTIONS OF ALGORITHMS AND
CORRECTNESS PROOFS
This section contains pseudocode for several algorithms used in
the main body, as well as proofs of their correctness.
In Algorithm 2, the Find_Maximal_Cliqes subroutine called
on line 14, which returns all maximal cliques in the subgraph in-
duced by CANDnn, is not specified: it can be implemented using
existing clique-finding algorithms.
In Algorithm 3, we provide more practical variants of some sub-
routines from Algorithm 2. We also modify the algorithm to return
all solutions (when possible), not only minimal ones. Specifically,
we replacedMin_Subcliqes with All_Subcliqes_P as defined
starting on line 15 in Algorithm 3. If it may be impractical to enu-
merate the subcliques whose sizes are in the right range, we do not
return any subcliques – the final solutions will be incomplete.
Lemma B.1 (Correctness of Alg. 1). Let DB be a database with
at most N different values, let V be the set of all possible range query
volumes, and let Velem be the set of elementary range volumes that
contains the minimum complemented volume. Then, after running
Algorithm 1 on (N ,V ) to obtain the sets Vnec and Vcand of necessary
and candidate nodes, we have
Vnec ⊆ Velem ⊆ Vcand.
Proof. We show that Vnec ⊆ Velem ⊆ Vcand holds throughout
Alg. 1. After line 11, we have Vnec ⊆ Velem since R = vol([1,N ])
is in Velem, and vmin is in Velem by design. After line 12, we have
Velem ⊆ Vcand since all elementary volumes are complemented.
To complete the proof, we show that if Vnec ⊆ Velem ⊆ Vcand,
then (i) Augment_NEC (Vcand,Vnec) ⊆ Velem, and (ii) Velem ⊆
Reduce_CAND(Vcand,Vnec).
First, consider the three ways in which Augment_NEC can add
elements to Vnec.
• (line 23) If |Vcand | = Nmin and Velem ⊆ Vcand, then clearly
Velem = Vcand since |Velem | ≥ Nmin.
• (line 26) Let e be a non-complemented volume. SinceVelem ⊆
Vcand, we know that every volume, including e , arises as a
node or an edge (or both) in the graph induced byVcand. The
volume e has no complement, so it must arise as an edge,
i.e., as the absolute difference of two volumes in Vcand. If all
such edges are incident to one node Vcand, then it must be
in Velem.
• (line 30) Let v be a non-necessary complemented volume
in Vcand. Every volume, including v , arises as a node or an
edge (or both) in the graph induced byVcand. If the volumev
arises only as itself and maybe edges incident to itself, then
it must be in Velem.
Next, consider Reduce_CAND. Let v be a non-necessary comple-
mented volume in Vcand. Since Vnec ⊆ Velem, and the volumes in
Velem are all adjacent to each other, any node that is not adjacent
to a subset of volumes in Velem cannot be in Velem. □
The main Get_Elem_Volumes procedure uses a few subrou-
tines. Gen_All_Volumes checks whether a subset of nodes gen-
erates all volumes in a given set (and perhaps other volumes).
Gen_Exact_Volumes additionally checks that only the volumes
in the given set are generated.Min_Subcliqes takes a clique Vk
that generates all volumes of a given set Vall and finds the minimal
subclique(s) of Vk that generate exactly the volumes in Vall. Here,
“minimal” refers to no strict subset of them generating all volumes
in Vall.
Lemma B.2 (Correctness of Alg. 2). Let DB be a database of
elements with N possible different values, let V be the set of all range
query volumes, and let Velem be the set of elementary range volumes
that contains the minimum complemented volume. Suppose we are
given two sets Vnec and Vcand such that Vnec ⊆ Velem ⊆ Vcand. Then,
after running Algorithm 2 on (N ,Vcand,Vnec,V ) to obtain the set
solutions , we have
• Velem ∈ solutions if 0 < V (the data is dense), or
• Velem ⊇ s for at least one s ∈ solutions (if the data is sparse).
Proof. First, if the data is dense (0 < V ), then clearly the num-
ber of elementary volumes is Nmin = Nmax = N . If the data is
sparse, there must be at least Nmin
def
=
⌈
−0.5 + 0.5 · √1 + 8 · |V |⌉
elementary volumes, otherwise there would be strictly fewer than
|V | range query volumes. There can be at most N − 1 because the
Algorithm 1 Graph pre-processing: finding a smaller subgraph.
1: procedure Graph_Preprocessing(N ,V )
2: R ← max{V }
3: if 0 ∈ V then
4: V ← V \ {0}
5: Nmin ←
⌈
−0.5 + 0.5 · √1 + 8 · |V |⌉
6: else
7: Nmin ← N
8: Vcomp ← {v ∈ V : R − v ∈ V } ∪ {R }
9: Vcomp ← V \Vcomp
10: vmin ← min{Vcomp } ▷ vol([1, 1]) or vol([N , N ])
11: Vnec ← {vmin, R }
12: Vcand ← Vcomp
13: all_processed ← FALSE
14: while not all_processed do
15: V ∗nec ← Augment_NEC(Vcand, Vnec, Vcomp, Nmin)
16: V ∗cand ← Reduce_CAND(Vcand, V ∗nec, V )
17: if V ∗cand = Vcand andV
∗
nec = Vnec then
18: all_processed ← TRUE
19: Vnec ← V ∗nec
20: Vcand ← V ∗cand
21: returnVcand, Vnec
22: procedure Augment_NEC(Vcand, Vnec, Vcomp, Nmin)
23: if |Vcand | = Nmin then
24: Vnec ← Vcand
25: returnVnec
26: for each e ∈ Vcomp :
27: for each v ∈ Vcand \Vnec :
28: if ∄(w, w ′) ∈ (Vcand \ {v })2 :
w −w ′ = e then
29: Vnec ← Vnec ∪ {v }
30: for each v ∈ Vcand \Vnec :
31: if ∄(w, w ′) ∈ (Vcand \ {v })2 :
w −w ′ = v then
32: Vnec ← Vnec ∪ {v }
33: returnVnec
34: procedure Reduce_CAND(Vcand, Vnec, V )
35: for each v ∈ Vcand \Vnec :
36: for each vnec ∈ Vnec :
37: if |v − vnec | < V then
38: Vcand ← Vcand \ {v }
39: returnVcand
occurrence of the volume 0 means at least one of the N values
did not appear in DB, and at most |Vcand | because it is known that
Velem ⊆ Vcand.
Now consider the graph G = (Vcand,E) with edge set
E
def
= {(v1,v2) ∈ Vcand ×Vcand : |v2 −v1 | ∈ V \ {0}}
and the induced subgraph Gnn
def
= G(Vcand \Vnec). Since the sub-
graph induced by Velem is a clique in G, the subgraph induced by
Velem \ Vnec will also be a clique in Gnn. Therefore, at least one
of the maximal cliques in Gnn output by Find_Maximal_Cliqes
(line 14), say V ∗k , will have Velem \Vnec as a subclique. The size of
V ∗k must be at least Nmin − |Vnec |, so the algorithm will proceed
to line 19 in this iteration. Since Velem ⊆ {Vnec ∪ V ∗k } generates
all volumes in V (and maybe others), solutions will be updated to
include the output of Min_Subcliqes (line 20).
SinceVelem \Vnec is a subset ofV ∗k , it will arise as a subclique on
line 39 of Min_Subcliqes.Velem generates all volumes inV and no
others, so the algorithm will proceed to line 41. If the data is dense,
then subcliques may contain only sets of size N = Nmin = Nmax,
so Velem cannot be a superset of any other element in subcliques,
so it will be added to this set. If the data is not dense, however,
then either (i) there is already a strict subset of Velem in subcliques
that generates exactly the volumes in V , or (ii) there is no such set,
Algorithm 2 Recovering elementary volumes via clique-finding.
1: procedure Get_Elem_Volumes(N , Vcand, Vnec, V )
2: if |Vcand | = |Vnec | then ▷ Pre-processing success
3: returnVnec
4: if 0 ∈ V then
5: V ← V \ {0}
6: Nmin ←
⌈
−0.5 + 0.5 · √1 + 8 · |V |⌉
7: Nmax ← min{N − 1, |Vcand | }
8: else
9: Nmin ← N
10: Nmax ← N
11: Mmin ← max{0, Nmin − |Vnec | }
12: Mmax ← Nmax −Vnec
13: CANDnn ← Vcand \Vnec ▷ Non-necessary candidate elem. volumes
14: cliques ← Find_Maximal_Cliqes(CANDnn)
15: solutions ← {}
16: for allVk ∈ cliques do
17: if |Vk | < Mmin then
18: continue
19: if Gen_All_Volumes(Vnec ∪Vk , V ) then
20: solutions ← solutions ∪
Min_Subcliqes(Vk , V , Mmin, Mmax, Vnec)
21: return solutions
22: procedure Gen_All_Volumes(Vnodes, Vall)
23: for all v ∈ Vall do
24: if ∄ (v1, v2) ∈ Vnodes ×Vnodes : |v2 − v1 | = v then
25: if v < Vall then
26: return FALSE
27: return TRUE
28: procedure Gen_Exact_Volumes(Vnodes, Vall)
29: if Vnodes ⊆ Vall and Gen_All_Volumes(Vnodes, Vall) then
30: for all (v1, v2) ∈ Vnodes ×Vnodes do
31: if |v2 − v1 | < Vall then
32: return FALSE
33: return TRUE
34: else
35: return FALSE
36: procedureMin_Subcliqes(Vk , Vall,mmin,mmax, Vnec)
37: subcliques ← {}
38: for allm ∈ {mmin, . . . , min{mmax, |Vk | } } do
39: for allVsk ∈ m-subsets(Vk ) do
40: if Gen_Exact_Volumes(Vnec ∪Vsk , Vall) then
41: if ∄V ′k ∈ subcliques : V ′k ⊂ {Vnec ∪Vsk } then
42: subcliques ← subcliques ∪ {Vnec ∪Vsk }
43: return subcliques
Algorithm 3 Practical, probabilistic subroutines for Alg. 2.
1: procedure Find_Maximal_Cliqes_P(CANDnn, Mmin, Vall)
2: cliques ← {}
3: if |CANDnn | ≤ 20 then
4: cliques ← Find_Maximal_Cliqes(CANDnn) ▷ NetworkX
5: else
6: for i ∈ {1, . . . , 1000} do
7: a_clique ← Find_A_Maximal_Cliqe(CANDnn) ▷ graph-tool
8: if |a_clique | ≥ Mmin then
9: cliques ← cliques ∪ {a_clique}
10: if cliques = {} then
11: return FAILURE ▷ All sampled cliques too small
12: if ∄Vk ∈ cliques : Gen_All_Volumes(Vnec ∪Vk , Vall) then
13: return FAILURE ▷ No sampled clique gen. all volumes
14: return cliques
15: procedure All_Subcliqes_P(Vk , Vall,mmin,mmax, Vnec)
16: subcliques ← {}
17: if ∑mmaxm=mmin ( |Vk |m ) ≤ 2000 then
18: for allm ∈ {mmin, . . . , min{mmax, |Vk | } } do
19: for allVsk ∈ m-subsets(Vk ) do
20: if Gen_Exact_Volumes(Vnec ∪Vsk , Vall) then
21: subcliques ← subcliques ∪ {Vnec ∪Vsk }
22: return subcliques
and Velem is added to subcliques. In all cases, any element added
to subcliques in Min_Subcliqes will form part of the solutions
output by Get_Elem_Volumes, completing the proof. □
Algorithm 4 Update recovery attack.
1: procedure Update_Recovery(V ,C ,N )
2: RangeFromVol← empty map
3: for x ∈ [1, N ] do
4: for y ∈ [x, N ] do
5: v ← ∑x≤k≤y C(k )
6: if RangeFromVol(v) is undefined then
7: RangeFromVol(v) ← [x, y]
8: else
9: RangeFromVol(v) ← ⊥
10: Possible← [1, N] ▷ Set of possible values
11: for v ∈ V do ▷ Iterate through observed volumes
12: if RangeFromVol(v − 1) = [x, y] and RangeFromVol(v) is undefined then
13: Possible = Possible ∩ [x, y]
14: if RangeFromVol(v) = [x, y] and RangeFromVol(v − 1) is undefined then
15: Possible = Possible \ [x, y]
16: return (min(Possible) +max(Possible))/2
C DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA
In this appendix we will describe the HCUP datasets used in our
experiments, as well as the steps we took to extract and process
the data. First, we will provide some background on the data. The
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) is a US govern-
ment agency which collects a vast amount of data on the American
healthcare industry. One of their core projects is the Healthcare
Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), which tracks how healthcare is
used and paid for by different demographic groups. Within HCUP
there are samples of different types taken every year and made
available to researchers. We use the National Inpatient Sample
(NIS) as our source of experimental data in this paper. Below and
in the main body, when we refer to “HCUP data” we mean the NIS.
The NIS is processed in a de-identifying way that protects patient
privacy.We did not attempt to deanonymize any of the data,
nor are our attacks designed to deanonymize medical data.
All authors underwent the HCUP Data Use Agreement training
and submitted signed Data Use Agreements to the HCUP Central
Distributor.
Figure 7 contains information about the number of hospitals
contained in each year’s HCUP release and theminimum,maximum,
and quartiles for the number of records per hospital. There is not too
much year-to-year variation in the number of records per hospital
for these years, which makes sense considering that until 2012 the
HCUP data was collected as a random sample from all hospitals
in the USA. This provides evidence that our experiments would
be predictive of our attacks’ performance (were they carried out
on a real hospital database). In 2012, the sampling methodology
for HCUP changed—more recent HCUP data is collected using a
random sample of patients instead of hospitals. We used the 2013
HCUP data (which contains about seven million patient records)
in our query reconstruction experiment in Section 5 as a source of
auxiliary data. Despite the 2013 auxiliary data being a somewhat
poorer estimate of per-hospital distributions for earlier years, our
query reconstruction attack still performed well with the 2013
auxiliary data (even when attacking 2004 hospitals!).
Attribute-specific processing. Information about the different
types of attributes is provided in Figure 7. Every year the AHRQ
prescribes a format and size for each attribute collected in the
various samples. In extracting per-attribute experimental data from
HCUP we faced three main complications: (1) hospitals do not
generally abide by these prescriptions, (2) the prescribed formats
change from year to year, and (3) not all attributes exist in all years
of HCUP data. We will describe how we address each of these
complications in turn.
Hospitals are strongly encouraged (but not required) to report
data in the format dictated by the AHRQ, and some hospitals choose
to report their data in incorrect or outdated formats. The AHRQ
corrects some of these mistakes before making samples available
publicly, but many mistakes still occurred in our data. For example,
the attributes NDX, NPR, and NCHRONIC are capped by the AHRQ,
but some hospitals still report greater values, which we simply
ignored.
In extracting NPR, NDX, and NCHRONIC we also faced the
second complication, namely that the number of values changed
(increasing from 16 to 26) in 2009. One other attribute whose format
changed is AGE. In 2012, for privacy reasons the AHRQ mandated
that ages be “top-coded” (i.e. all values above a threshold be grouped
into one category) at 90 in all samples. Prior HCUP data was not
top-coded; however, for our experiments we chose to top-code all
AGE data for two main reasons: (1) to ensure results for AGE are
comparable across years and (2) to make our experiments address
practical security risks to real deployments (in which ages may be
top-coded). In Section 3 we discuss how this impacts the accuracy
of our clique-finding attack.
The only attribute which did not appear in all years (namely not
in 2004) of HCUP data was NCHRONIC. Since we had several other
datasets for that attribute and the performance of all attacks on that
attribute was similar across experiments, we were not concerned.
We were not able to obtain the full 2008 NIS, and as a result we did
not have MRISK or SEV data for that year. Our attacks performed
well on the 2004 and 2009 MRISK and SEV attributes.
# Patient records per hospital
Year # Hospitals Min 25% 50% 75% Max
2004 1004 15 1199 4300 11523 71580
2008 1056 3 889 3439 11170 117372
2009 1050 1 750 3278 10487 121668
Attribute name Abbrev. Size # Queries 2004 2008 2009
Age (in days) AGEDAY 365 66795 ✓ ✓ ✓
Length of stay LOS 365 66795 ✓ ✓ ✓
Age (years) AGE 91 4186 ✓ ✓ ✓
Admission month AMONTH 12 78 ✓ ✓ ✓
# Chronic conditions NCHRONIC 16 136 ✓
NCHRONIC 26 351 ✓
# Diagnoses NDX 16 136 ✓ ✓
NDX 26 351 ✓
# Procedures NPR 16 136 ✓ ✓
NPR 26 351 ✓
ZIP code income quartile ZIPINC 4 10 ✓ ✓ ✓
Mortality risk MRISK 4 10 ✓ ✓
Disease severity SEV 4 10 ✓ ✓
Figure 7: (Top) Number of hospitals and quartiles for number of
records per hospital for 2004, 2008 and 2009 HCUP data. (Bottom)
Attributes used in our experiments, their sizes, abbreviations, and
their availability for each target year.
